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Abstract 
We provide new and clear evidence about the importance of liquidity constraints for post-
secondary vocational education. Using two discontinuities that are used to allocate seats in free 
vocational education and eligibility for educational grants, we exploit the relationship between OLS 
and IV estimates of returns to education to test for the presence of short run liquidity in the fashion 
of Card (2001). Eligibility to financial aid increases enrollment in vocational education between 8 to 13 
percentage points. Furthermore, we find that when we instrument post-secondary schooling with 
eligibility for financial aid IV estimates are larger than OLS estimates, suggesting that compliers to this 
instrument are individuals with high returns to education but who were not enrolling in post-
secondary education before due to liquidity constraints. However, when the instrument is not linked 
with the cost of education IV estimates are not significantly larger than OLS estimates. Our analysis 
focuses on access to free vocational education, hence our results shed lights on the importance of the 
opportunity cost. 
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1 Introduction
The income gap in tertiary education enrollment is well documented in both developed economies (Carneiro
and Heckman, 2002, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011, Murakami and Blom, 2008, Belley et al., 2014) and
developing economies (Gonza´lez-Velosa et al., 2015, Murakami and Blom, 2008). By 2015 in Colombia, among
the individuals who finished high school and took the national test to enter in university more than 40%
belonged to the lowest socioeconomic status (SES) group and less than 1% belonged to the highest SES group.
Nevertheless, the gap in tertiary education enrollment was about 50 percentage points (A´lvarez et al., 2017).1
Despite the evidence about the difference in enrollment rates by income, there is no consensus in the literature
about how much of this difference is explained by the presence or not of short run liquidity constraints.
The evidence for developed countries is inconclusive. On the one hand, some studies show that even when
controlling for ability, family income and access to credit are strongly correlated with enrollment in tertiary
education (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011, Brown et al., 2011, Belzil et al., 2017, among others). On the
other hand, Keane and Wolpin (2001), Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Cameron and Taber (2004), show
small effects of short run liquidity constraints on enrollment in tertiary education. According to these authors,
long run and structural differences such as the ability or readiness to study, explain the differences in enrollment
rates shown in the data, over the existence or not of credit constraints.
In Latin America the evidence is in favor of the existence of liquidity or borrowing constraints in tertiary
education, as it has been documented in multiple papers, such as Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009), Rau et al.
(2013) and Solis (2017). Still, Alfonso (2009) used data from Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, to argue
that short run monetary constraints lose importance when one takes into account long run factors such as the
education of parents or the ownership of assets.
Independently of these results, the discussions around liquidity constraints focuses on the analysis of changes
in tuition fees. However, the literature has overlooked the importance of other costs associated to enrolling in
post-secondary education such as maintenance cost and the opportunity cost. Some authors acknowledge the
effect of changes in the opportunity cost on school decisions using variations in local labour markets, for example
Fuller et al. (1982), Cameron and Taber (2004) and Flannery and ODonoghue (2013).
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we provide new evidence to the literature on the importance
of short-term liquidity constraints on post-secondary education. Second, our results quantify the importance of
the opportunity cost of tertiary education.
We take advantage of two different discontinuities that affect enrollment in free vocational education in
Colombia. The first discontinuity exploits the conditions to participate in a nationwide program known as
Youth in action, Jo´venes en Accio´n in Spanish (JeA). The program offers a monthly grant around 68 USD
to poor youths who enroll in vocational education (Prosperidad-Social, 2017).2 JeA beneficiaries are selected
principally by using a poverty score known as Sisben. The second discontinuity comes from the selection process
of Sena.3 Sena is a national institution that offers free vocational education through a scheme of one-year or
two-year courses. When a given course has an excess of demand, the institution select the participants by means
1Enrollment in any kind of tertiary education was about 10% and 60% for the lowest and highest SES respectively.
2The grant is around 34% of the average monthly wage of a young individual with secondary education
3Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje in Spanish, which translates to Learning National Service
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of an entry exam where the individuals with the highest scores get offered a position in the course first.
Therefore, we have an ideal scenario for analyzing two sources of exogenous variation in enrollment to
vocational education. However, only the variation around the cutoff used by JeA to select beneficiaries affects
enrollment in Sena by reducing the liquidity constraints of eligible individuals. Comparing the effects of these
two discontinuities on enrollment on vocational education and the subsequent behavior in the labor market, we
provide evidence of the existence of liquidity constraints even in the case of free post-secondary education.
To test the presence of liquidity constraints we follow Card (2001)’s argument. Even though, ordinary
least square (OLS) estimates of the returns of education should be upper biased due to unobserved ability,
the literature shows that instrumental variable (IV) estimates are usually larger than OLS estimates. Card
(2001) argues that IV estimates should be interpreted as the weighted local average treatment effect (LATE) of
compliers. Then, when one instrument schooling with a variable related with changes in the cost of education
and the IV estimate are larger than the OLS, one can argue that the IV estimate represents the LATE of
a set of compliers whose expected returns of education are larger than the expected returns of education of
non-compliers. As a result, one can argue that these compliers did not achieve more education in the past due
to the existence of liquidity constraints.
We exploit the analogy between fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) and IV estimations (Lee and Lemieux,
2010). We use both discontinuities as instruments for enrolling in vocational education, but one of our in-
struments represents changes in the cost of education (poverty score) and the other (entry exam) does not.
Therefore, we test the argument made by Card (2001) through comparing OLS and IV in both cases.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and others pointed out some limitations of testing for liquidity constraints by
comparing OLS and IV estimates. The main flaws come from (1) weak or invalid instruments, (2) unobserved
comparative advantages in the labor markets and (3) the choice of school quality. However, our multiple RD
estimates and the fact that all individuals in our analysis applied for the same educational institution, allow us
to overcome these limitations.
We complement the analysis using both discontinuities together in the fashion of a Multiple Regression
Discontinuity design (MRD) (Papay et al., 2011). In this case, we constrain our analysis to individuals who are
closely affected by both discontinuities to understand the scenarios where one discontinuity explains variations
in enrollment better than the other. Specifically, we use this strategy to show that when the opportunity cost
increases, access to financial aid gains importance with respect to getting the first offer to join a course thanks
to an exam score.
To summarize, eligibility for financial aid increases the probability of enrolling in vocational from 13% to 20%
for one-year courses, and from 15% to 28% for two-year courses. We also find that IV estimates are larger than
OLS estimates when we instrument enrollment with the eligibility for financial aid, while the IV estimates are
not significantly different than the OLS estimates when we use the discontinuity of the entry exam as instrument
of enrollment. This result is stronger in individuals who applied to a two-year course. In addition, when we
use the MRD we find that for one-year courses enrollment reacts strongly to the exam discontinuity. However,
in the case of two-year courses the effect of the eligibility for financial aid overcomes the effect of the exam
discontinuity. The latest result shows that liquidity constraints gain importance when the opportunity cost
increases, as individuals are expected to leave the labor market for longer periods in order to study.
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It is very important to point out that we focus our analysis on the case of free vocational education. Hence,
our results are quantifying the importance of liquidity constraints regarding the opportunity cost of studying.
This cost is usually forgotten in the literature and most important in the public policy debate. In particular,
many countries in Latin America have been discussing reductions in college tuition fees or loans/scholarships
to cover tuition fees (Solis, 2017, Didriksson, 2018). Our results contribute to policy makers by illustrating the
limitation of public policies that only focus on tuition fees.
This paper is organized as follow: in section 2 we describe some characteristics of the Colombian education
system including a description of Sena and JeA. In section 3 we describe the data. In section 4 we explain our
estimation strategy. We present and discuss the main results in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional context
Tertiary education in Colombia has been growing constantly over the last two decades. The total enrollment
rate increased from 23.7% to 48.9% between 2002 and 2015.4 Within tertiary education, by 2015 one third
was enrolled in vocational studies: 27,0% in technological two-year and 3,6% in technical one-year courses. As
explained above, Sena is the largest public institution dedicated to oﬀering vocational studies in Colombia.
By 2015, Sena’s enrollees added up to 425847 individuals, with these representing 60% of total individuals in
vocational education. As shown in ﬁgure 1, the growth of total vocational education was helped by an increase in
Sena’s enrollees. However, the total participation of vocational education in tertiary education remains relatively
constant because the large increase in tertiary education is driven by an increase in college level degrees.
Figure 1: Enrollees in tertiary education, vocational education and Sena. Total and participation rates
(a) Enrollees in vocational education by institution (b) Enrollment rate in tertiary and vocational educa-
tion
Source: SNIES
The supply of education in Sena is present throughout Colombia, covering both rural and urban areas in
every Department. There are three main characteristics of Sena’s education: (1) both one-year and two-year
courses are free of charge (no tuition fees). (2) as part of the educational program individuals enter into an
internship system; and (3) Sena uses an entry exam to allocate places in each course when there is an excess of
demand.
4 Information from the National System of Information for Higher Education (SNIES) - Sistema Nacional de Informacio´n de la
Educacio´n Superior, in Spanish
4
To meet the aim of facilitating the demand for post-secondary education in low income young individuals,
the Colombian government created the nationwide program JeA under the management of Prosperidad Social
(Department of Social Prosperity in charge of social policy).5 This program includes support for students in
Sena.
JeA has three strategies to support students in Sena. First, the Program offers a USD 139 bimonthly grant
to its beneficiaries on the condition that they remain enroll in Sena. Second, JeA provides a preferential entry
to Sena. The Program reserves of 30% of seats in each course regarding of the score obtained at the entry exam.
Finally, there is an additional optional component intended to strengthen their non-cognitive abilities called
Habilidades para la Vida. In appendix B we provide detailed and strong evidence that the first component of
JeA drives all the impacts.
From August 2014 until October 2015 JeA selected its beneficiaries mainly based on a poverty-based score
called Sisben.6. Among the established criteria, 87% of the total beneficiaries were admitted by the Sisben III
which is a poverty index that assigns a score between 0 o 100 from the most to the least vulnerable households.7
Then, this score allow us to exploit one discontinuity in the access for our empirical strategy.
The main objective of the JeA is to help poor individuals to join vocational education in order to increase
their wealth in the future. In Colombia young high school graduates earn about USD 198 monthly. Therefore,
JeA financial aid is equivalent to 34% of the monthly income of its beneficiaries. Moreover, income increase to
USD 245 monthly when an individual has a vocational education degree. In addition, the probability of formal
employment rises from 14% to 24%. Using detailed information about the probability of working (in the formal
or the informal market) and the average income for different educational levels and ages, we calculate that the
present value of lifetime benefits from vocational education is around USD 6960. Meanwhile, the forgone income
for studying two years is USD 2640.8
The latest data means that in the case of perfect credit markets, young poor individuals should loan enough
to stay out of the labor market for two years and get education in Sena. However, in Colombia credit markets
are strongly segmented and only 20% of low income households get access to any kind of formal credit (Murcia,
2007). In addition, educational loans focus on supporting university level education and do not take into account
individuals who want to enroll in Sena, given that education is free for them.
This is initial evidence of liquidity constrains for vocational education. In section 4 we show our strategy to
estimate how important these constraints are.
3 Data
We combine information from different sources. First, we use administrative data from Sena about all the
individuals who applied for a one-year or two-year courses since the second half of 2014 to the first semester of
5See the Resolution No. 1970 of 21/nov 2012 and Prosperidad-Social (2017) for details.
6There was a previous version -JeA-2005- studied in Attanasio et al. (2017) and Attanasio et al. (2011). The intervention in the first
version was different to the one we study and focuses in professional training to employed youths in private educational institutions
7Targeted people also includes individuals in the adoption list of the ICBF “Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar”, Individuals
from recognized indigenous groups, individuals from Red Unidos (RU) which is the program which coordinates different social welfare
interventions, and victims Registry from the Colombian armed conflict.
8Using information from the National Life Quality Survey 2016 (Dane)
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2015. Second, we merge this data with the administrative registries of Sisben scores at household level.9. By
using this combined database, it is possible to determine which individuals were eligible for the program and
also observe whether the individuals joined Sena or not. It is also possible to observe their trajectory during the
course, for example if they dropped out or completed their studies. Third, we use JeAs information to identify
which individuals were beneficiaries of the Program.
After studying at Sena, individuals move into the labor market. In order to assess the medium/long term
effects of financial aid for post-secondary students, we combine our data with the information of the Social
Security contributions from the Colombian Ministry of Labor (PILA), from August 2014 until December 2017.
The PILA database contains information about compulsory contributions made by employed individuals to
social security. Attanasio et al. (2017) defined an individual as a formal worker if she makes her compulsory
contributions to social security. Therefore, if a given month we find an individual in PILA’s database is because
that individual has a formal job that month. Individuals with no reports to PILA are either not working
(unemployed or inactive) or working in the informal market.
Given that our strategy is based on exploiting changes around discontinuities in the Sisben score and the
entry exam, we constrained our sample to the individuals who may be affected by both discontinuities. Hence,
we only include individuals who applied to courses with excess of demand and without a second entry exam,
because in these courses the entry exam cutoff determines who gets the first offer to enroll. We also eliminated
all the individuals who were younger than 18 years old when they applied to Sena, because it is not possible to
merge them with the PILA registry.
9We use the data from Sisben version III, which was used to allocate social benefits from 2011 to 2016
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As a result, we obtain information about 139 thousand applications of 92.6 thousand individuals, given that
one individual can apply to more than one course. 64 thousand applications were made to one-year courses
and 75 thousand to the two-year. For both one- and two-year courses, the proportion of men is marginally
below 50% (See table 1). There are a considerable proportion of students below the Sisben cutoff in one- and
two-year courses (83.45% and 77.65%, respectively), which shows that vulnerable people are being targeted with
vocational education.
Regarding of the benefits provided by these courses, enrollment levels are lower in one-year courses even if
they obtain a score above the entry exam cutoff. There is a higher proportion of individuals enrolled in the last
period (2015-I) in shorter courses, with the opposite trend for longer courses. However, there is no evidence
in favor of sorting or discontinuities based on the type of course. The average score in the entry exam are
similar between vulnerable and non-vulnerable applicants, as shown in table 1 and figure 18 in the appendix.
Nevertheless, it is observed that scores are higher for applicants to longer courses. Table 1 also shows that the
average individual is about 20 years old and more than 90% applications were living in urban areas (area 1 and
2) when they were assessed for the Sisben score.
The characteristics of applicants according to the courses exhibit some patterns. First, the unconditional
average size is higher in two-year courses, but there is no difference in wealth or ability as it is expected.
Therefore, there is a considerable excess of demand in that courses which implies that about one in five individuals
gain a place.
In terms of labor market indicators, there are unconditional differences in labor participation according to
vulnerability and ability that grows with the length of the courses. In fact, the proportion of months working
in one- and two-year courses is lower in most vulnerable individuals (0.2 and 0.31) than individuals in better
socioeconomic conditions (0.32 and 0.44), respectively. This pattern also persists for other labour outcomes.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the labor market participation over time, from the month each individual
applied to Sena.
Once an individual complete her education at Sena, the main question is about her economic returns of
education proxied by performance in the labor market, in the absence of available wages. We assessed the
importance of liquidity constrains through the following labor market indicators: (1) working at least one
month, (2) the proportion of months working, (3) working in the last semester, (4) longest employment and
(6) longest unemployment spell. The first three indicators measure participation and the last two stability in
labor market. To construct this indicators we use registries that are available at PILA, from August 2014 to
December 2017.
As evidence of the role played by monetary aid, figure 2 compares labor market participation trends since the
moment each individual applied to Sena by course type (one- and two-year courses). After applying, enrollees
in Sena work less than individuals who did not enroll. Thereafter, enrollees’ formal employment grows sharply
during the internship months period. After the internship, formal employment drops but remains above the
employment rate of the non-enrolled. This patter is stronger for the case of two-year courses. This fact reveals
some evidence in favor of the importance of financial aid for covering expenses different than tuition fees. That
is, individuals are able to study instead of working for a period in order to increase their participation after
completing the vocational courses. In addition, it is observed that a higher fraction of individuals obtain formal
8
Figure 2: Formal labor market participation by enrollment in Sena
(a) one-year course (b) two-year course
jobs during the internship provided by the program, but this difference tends to disappear after some period of
time.
There are two main limitations to our data. First, the match PILA data uses national identification numbers,
but individuals only obtain these numbers when they are 18 years old. Therefore, we cannot include individuals
who applied to Sena when they were 16 or 17 years old. These may be individuals with greater preferences for
tertiary education because they applied soon after finishing high school.
Second, PILA only reports on formal labor market participation. As we explained before, when and individual
is not in the PILA database she may be either unemployed, working informally or outside the labor market.
This is a challenge for our analysis, as Colombia has the largest informal employment rate among the OECD
countries. By 2016, the self-employment rate in Colombia was 51.3%, while the average among OECD countries
was 16.2%.10 Therefore, our estimations are not taking into account the returns of education through informal
employment.
4 Estimation strategy
The main purpose of this paper is to exploit two different discontinuities in Sena’s enrollment and JeA’s selection
criteria to disentangle the importance of liquidity constraints on enrollment on vocational education. The
advantage of comparing these two discontinuities is having two variables that exogenously affect enrollment in
post-secondary education, but only one of them is linked with changes in the cost of education. In this section
we describe our two approaches to test for the existence of short run liquidity constraints.
4.1 RD-IV and OLS comparisons
We begin our analysis by exploring each discontinuity independently to take advantage of two sources of exoge-
nous variation in enrollment in free vocational education.
The first discontinuity we explore is JeA eligibility criteria using Sisben’s score. As mentioned in the last
10Self-employment measure as the proportion of self-employed workers among all workers. Data from OECD employment and labor
market statistics database.
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section, the Sisben score is a mechanism used by Colombian authorities to allocate different social services.
JeA uses this score as its main targeting strategy, enrolling more than 80% of its participants through this
mechanism.11 The second discontinuity comes from the existence of an admission test which is designed to
allocate the seats for over demanded courses.
We declare υi as the difference between individual i’s Sisben score and the cutoff of her area.
12 We can then
declare Di = 1 [υi ≤ 0], which represents a dummy variable equal to one if the individual i is eligible for JeA.
Furthermore, µij is the distance between an individual’s exam score and the admission cutoff in the course she
applied to. Aij = 1 [µij ≥ 0] is a dummy value with the value of one if the individual i gets the first offer to
enroll on a course j. Finally, Sij takes the value of one if the individual i enrolls in Sena’s course j and zero if
not.
Our first step is to show that both discontinuities change the probability of enrolling in Sena. As explained
previously, Sena offers one- and two-year courses. Given that longer courses may imply a larger the opportunity
cost of studying, we always separate the analysis by course type.
Figure 3 shows how for both discontinuities, the Sisben score and the entry exam , there is a significant
change in the probability of enrolling in Sena around the cutoffs. However, in the case of the Sisben score, the
discontinuity is significantly larger for the applications to two-year courses than for one-year courses. This is our
first piece of evidence for the existence of liquidity constraints. The effect of eligibility for financial aid increases
with the length of the course as the opportunity cost increases. It is possible that the differences in the effect
of the Sisben discontinuity come from individuals choosing different course length. However, figure 18 in the
appendix C shows that there is no sorting for one- or two-year courses around both discontinuities.
Formally, followingLee and Lemieux (2010) and others, we estimate a simple RD reduced form of the shape:
Si = β0 + β1Di + g (υi, Di) + i (1)
And
Si = ρ0 + ρ1Ai + f (µi, Ai) + ηi (2)
Where, β1 captures the effect of being eligible for financial aid in the probability of enrolling in Sena, and ρ1
captures the effect of receiving the first offer to join a course in the probability of enrolling in Sena. g (υi, Di)
and f (µi, Ai) are polynomial forms of each forcing variables in both sides of each cutoff.
In order to provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that reductions in liquidity constraints caused the
changes in enrollment in figure 3, we follow the discussion in Card (2001) and others. In the standard estimation
of returns to schooling (Mincer, 1974), OLS estimates are upper biased due to unobserved ability and/or taste
for education. Nevertheless, in the literature IV estimates are usually larger that OLS estimates.13 Following
Imbens and Angrist (1994), Card (2001) argues that IV estimates cannot be interpreted as an average treatment
effect (ATE), but instead they represent the weighted local average treatment effect (LATE) of the compliers.
11As explained before, 87% of JeA participants entered the program through the Sisben score Prosperidad-Social (2017). In our
analysis, we exclude all other targeted populations.
12It is important to remember that JeA uses three different cutoffs for different areas
13See the revisions by Card (2001), Brown et al. (2011)
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Figure 3: Enrollment in Sena by distance to the Sisben and entry exam cutoffs
Sisben score υi
(a) one-year course (b) two-year course
Entry exam µi
(c) one-year course (d) two-year course
Notes: Authors’ calculations using Sena’s inscriptions and Sisben’s data. Exam’s cutoffs are simulated by considering JeA’s preferential entry
scheme. 95% CI in dashed lines. Bin size of 1 point. Adjusted function form using 3 degree polynomial.
Therefore, instrumenting schooling with a variable related with changes in the cost of education will result in IV
estimates larger than OLS because the compliers to these instruments are individuals whose expected returns
to education are larger than the expected returns of education of non-compliers. However, these compliers did
not achieve more education in the past due to the existence of liquidity constraints.
Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), our RD estimates are analogous to IV estimations around each cutoff.
Given that we do not have data on wages we will estimate the returns to education on formal labor market
participation. Then, if Yi is the formal labor market indicator of i, then the RD-IV estimator around the Sisben
cutoff is:
τY =
limc↑0E [Y |υi = c]− limc↓0E [Y |υi = c]
limc↑0E [S|υi = c]− limc↓0E [S|υi = c] (3)
Additionally, the RD-IV estimator around the exam cutoff is:
γY =
limc↑0E [Y |µi = c]− limc↓0E [Y |µi = c]
limc↑0E [S|µi = c]− limc↓0E [S|µi = c] (4)
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Conditional on some basic assumptions that we discuss later on, both τY and γY are unbiased estimates
of the effect of enrolling in Sena on the labor market indicator Y . Following Imbens and Angrist (1994), Lee
and Lemieux (2010) and Card (2001), each estimator represents the LATE of different type of compliers. τY
quantifies the effect of Sena’s education on the labor market for those individuals who enrolled because they were
eligible for receiving financial aid through JeA.14 One can expect that the expected returns of Sena’s education
for these individuals is larger than the expected return for the non-compliers, because their decision to enroll is
a response to changes in the cost of education. Therefore, one can argue that these compliers were not entering
in Sena before being eligible to financial aid due to liquidity constraints.
γY quantifies the effect of Sena’s education on the labor market for those individuals who receive the first
chance to enroll. In this case, characterizing the compliers may not be that simple. One can argue that
compliers are individuals with higher implicit utility from education, which may be also correlated with higher
productivity and better returns in the labor market. In this case, IV estimates may also be higher than OLS
estimates. Another possibility is that compliers in this case are individuals who were able to enter in their
first-choice course. Once again, if the correlation between studying in the first-choice course and productivity is
positive, then one may expect that IV estimates are larger than OLS ones. Finally, if the decision of compliers
is not correlated with the expected returns in the labor market, one can expect that IV estimates are lower than
OLS estimates because we are correcting the ability bias.
Thus, if βY is the OLS estimate of the effect of S on Y , one can expect that in the presence of liquidity
constraints τY > βY . Although, we do not have any prior beliefs about the relationship between γY and βY .
Indeed, if γY represents the ATE, one can even expect that γY < βY .
There are some limitations and criticism to this strategy. Griliches (1977) and Angrist and Keueger (1991)
argue that IV estimates may be larger than OLS estimates due to measurement error. Additionally, Carneiro
and Heckman (2002) discusses the limitations of this type of analysis. First, instruments are usually weak or
invalid. Second, even if the instruments are valid, then IV can be larger than OLS due to some unobserved
comparative advantage in labor markets. Third, instruments usually neglect school quality choice.
In the following section we will show evidence of how our estimations overcome the latest shortcomings in
the strategy.
4.2 Multiple regression discontinuity design (MRD)
We can also compare the discontinuities in υi and µi using double discontinuity analysis in the fashion of Papay
et al. (2011). We can estimate the following equation:
Sij = α0 + α1Di + α2Aij + α3Di ×Aij + g (υi) + f (µij) + φij (5)
In this case, α1, α2 and α3 provide information on which forces are stronger when we focus on those
individuals who are marginally affected by both discontinuities. Then, we can investigate in which cases the
possibility of receiving monetary aid gains importance. Figure 4 shows that there is no correlation between both
forcing variables. Additionally, in the same figure we see that for this analysis we can divide the population into
14Indeed τY includes the aggregated effect of monetary aid, preferential entry and soft skills training. In appendix B we show
sufficient evidence to support JeA’s impacts are driven by the financial aid above all the other benefits.
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four areas. Quadrant [I] shows the individuals who received the first offer to join a course and also are eligible
for financial aid. Individuals in quadrant [II] received the first offer to join a course, but are not eligible for
financial aid. Quadrant [III] includes individuals who did not get either the first offer nor financial aid, and
quadrant [IV ] includes individuals who did not get the first offer, but are eligible for financial aid.
Figure 4: Poverty score vs entry exam (distance to cutoff) by course length
(a) one-year course (b) two-year course
Notes: Grid size 1 x 1 points per variable. Circle size represents the number of individuals by grid.
Then, when we link estimates from equation 5 and figure 4 we can estimate the average value of any outcome
variable Y¯ (including enrollment in Sena Si) as:
• Y¯ I = αˆ0 + αˆ1 + αˆ2 + αˆ3, is the average of Y for individuals who are eligible for financial aid and received
the first offer to join a course.
• Y¯ II = αˆ0 + αˆ2, is the average of Y for individuals who are not eligible for financial aid but received the
first offer to join a course.
• Y¯ III = αˆ0, is the average of Y for individuals who are not eligible for financial aid and did not received
the first offer to join a course.
• Y¯ IV = αˆ0 + αˆ1, is the average of Y for individuals who are eligible for financial aid but did not receive
the first offer to join a course.
Comparing Y¯ I , Y¯ II , Y¯ III and Y¯ IV , we can infer in which cases and for which outcome variables financial
aid gains importance.
5 Results
As explained previously, our first analysis uses the analogy between RD and IV estimations. Appendix A
discusses the results of the tests of continuity of confounding factor and manipulation around the cutoffs for
both forcing variables, the Sisben score and the entry exam following Lee and Lemieux (2010).
Figure 3 already showed graphically the effects of both discontinuities on the probability of enrolling in Sena.
Additionally, table 2 shows the resulting estimates of each discontinuity on the probability to enroll in Sena by
course type and gender (as equations 1 and 2).
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Table 2: Effect of discontinuities in Sisben score and Sena’s entry exam on enrollment in Sena
one-year course 2 years course
All Female Male All Female Male
Discontinuity in the Sisben score
Sisben score ≤ cutoff 0.075∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.093∗ 0.057∗ 0.055∗ 0.043∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.110∗∗
(0.025) (0.017) (0.039) (0.025) (0.021) (0.018) (0.027) (0.017) (0.032) (0.030) (0.038) (0.016)
Constant 0.133∗∗ -0.074∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.451∗∗ 0.136∗∗ -0.106∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(0.023) (0.029) (0.031) (0.104) (0.027) (0.034) (0.014) (0.053) (0.019) (0.061) (0.017) (0.073)
Controls and FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
F test 9.33 9.75 5.62 5.29 6.55 5.59 21.78 40.41 24.38 15.30 10.05 45.26
R2 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.31 0.01 0.26
Bandwidth 10.72 11.44 10.45 11.47 12.18 12.80 9.09 8.44 10.59 8.92 11.34 9.34
N 16110 17278 7595 8410 9495 10017 20145 18744 11398 9566 12832 10738
Discontinuity in the entry exam
Entry exam ≥ cutoff 0.147∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.096∗∗
(0.023) (0.021) (0.034) (0.032) (0.025) (0.027) (0.021) (0.019) (0.040) (0.037) (0.021) (0.019)
Constant 0.309∗∗ 0.231∗ 0.326∗∗ 1.636∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 1.202∗∗ 0.282∗∗ 0.402∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.456∗∗ 0.299∗∗ 0.337∗∗
(0.025) (0.113) (0.038) (0.160) (0.022) (0.101) (0.026) (0.053) (0.044) (0.057) (0.020) (0.063)
Controls and FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
F test 40.67 47.38 22.55 16.80 21.08 12.02 41.88 34.15 11.18 10.75 34.63 25.55
R2 0.11 0.26 0.14 0.31 0.13 0.27 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.25
Bandwidth 3.56 3.86 3.67 5.32 6.42 5.11 4.48 4.35 5.08 4.92 5.65 5.40
N 12152 12982 6377 8950 10015 8143 20793 20256 11384 11069 12971 12499
Notes: Standard errors clustered at municipality level, + 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01. Bandwidths following Calonico et al. (2014). We use a 3rd degree
polynomial for the distance to each cutoff. Controls include gender, age, participation in FeA, application year, Sisben area, number of applications,
course takeout (%), Sena center fixed effects and Sena program fixed effect. F test is the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic.
With respect to the Sisben score (upper panel), the effect of being eligible for financial aid is stronger
for individuals who applied to two-year courses than for individuals who applied for one-year courses. This
is reflected by larger and more significant coefficients (the total effect is around 4 percentage points and 10
percentage points for 1 years and 2 years courses respectively). As previously explained, the heterogeneity in
the results is our first piece of evidence about the importance of liquidity constraints for the opportunity cost.
In the case of free education, the only difference in the cost of education is the time you have to leave the labor
market in order to study. Therefore, we can assume that longer courses imply higher opportunity cost and a
larger need for financial aid.
The table also shows the F test for being eligible for financial aid. Given that our estimates are weaker for
one-year courses, F tests are consequently small. This limits our analysis because the Sisben’s discontinuity will
be a weak instrument for enrollment in one-year courses. For two-year courses we have a strong instrument
regardless of the gender.
The lower panel shows the results with respect to the entry exam discontinuity. In this case the results are
more homogeneous and the effect of the exam discontinuity on enrollment varies from 9 to 15 percentage points.
Additionally, the F test is always larger than 10 in all cases, which is evidence the this discontinuity is a strong
instrument for enrollment in Sena.
Using Sena’s data we can also examine the effect of each discontinuity on the completion of individuals
vocational education. Table 3 shows the resulting estimates. In this case, for both discontinuities the effects
are weaker than the ones on enrollment. Regarding Sisben’s discontinuity, we only find positive effects for the
unconditional case, meaning that most of the difference between eligible and non-eligible individuals comes from
changes in enrollment rates. Once we compare to individuals who are enrolled, being eligible for financial aid
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makes no difference to the probability of finishing their studies.
With respect to the exam’s discontinuity, when we analyze the effect on the unconditional probability of
obtaining a diploma from Sena we find positive effects in one a two-year courses. This results come from the
strong effect we found on enrollment rates. However, when we constrained to individuals who enrolled in Sena,
we only find a 2.2 percentage points effect for the case of males in two-year courses.
Even though there are some positive and statistically significant coefficients, the F tests are always very
small regardless of the discontinuity or the course type. Therefore, we will not use studies completion in our
instrumental variable analysis. It is also important to point out that the few positive significant effects we find
are only for males but not females, which can reflect asymmetries in the opportunity cost by gender.
Table 3: Effect of discontinuities in Sisben score and Sena’s entry exam on vocational studies completion
Completed studies Completed studies | enrolled
one-year course 2 years course one-year course 2 years course
All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male
Discontinuity in the Sisben score
Sisben score ≤ cutoff 0.022∗ 0.032 0.023 0.009+ 0.008 0.010∗ 0.012 0.048 0.044 0.024 0.018 0.042
(0.009) (0.023) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.050) (0.156) (0.124) (0.019) (0.028) (0.027)
F test 6.36 1.90 2.75 3.65 2.48 4.31 0.05 0.09 0.13 1.55 0.41 2.47
R2 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.16
Bandwidth 12.25 11.55 11.89 13.88 13.74 12.74 13.10 10.77 10.30 12.47 12.46 10.53
N 18635 8470 9279 30961 14984 14534 3158 1138 1354 5807 2657 2634
Discontinuity in the entry exam
Entry exam ≥ cutoff 0.023+ 0.024 0.026∗ 0.006∗ 0.001 0.009∗ -0.053 -0.066 -0.001 0.017+ -0.018 0.021+
(0.013) (0.023) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.038) (0.055) (0.033) (0.009) (0.026) (0.011)
F test 3.45 1.02 5.17 4.76 0.15 4.71 1.88 1.41 0.00 3.63 0.48 3.39
R2 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.13
Bandwidth 5.71 7.54 7.83 9.99 8.95 11.55 7.71 8.08 8.45 7.93 6.50 6.92
N 18563 12361 11895 40635 18375 22799 6832 3682 3418 10075 4172 4887
Notes: As per table 2.
5.1 RD-IV estimations
In this section we present the results from our RD-IV estimations. Given the results showed in tables 2 and 3,
we focus our analysis comparing IV and OLS results for both discontinuities on the effect of enrolling in two-year
courses.15
Recalling from the previous section, IV estimates represent the LATE of compliers. Therefore, if they are
larger than OLS estimates we can conclude that the average return of schooling of compliers is larger than the
average return of non-compliers. If the instrument is related to changes in the cost of education and the IV
estimates are larger than OLS estimates, one can argue that compliers with high returns to education were not
entering into tertiary education due to the existence of short run liquidity constraints.
In our case, the Sisben discontinuity reflects changes in the cost of education through eligibility for financial
aid. Meanwhile, the exam discontinuity effect to enrollment has no relationship with changes in the relative
cost of education. Table 4 shows OLS and IV estimates for the case of three variables related to labor market
participation: i) the probability of working at least one month, ii) the proportion of periods an individual works,
15The results for one-year courses are in tables 10, 11 in appendix C.
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and iii) the probability of working in the last semester of 2017. It is important to remember that we only analyze
labor market participation 24 months after applying to Sena to exclude the period individuals should have left
the labor market in order to work and to not include the effect of Sena’s internship.
Table 4: Effect of enrollment in Sena for applicants to two-year courses on formal labor market participation.
OLS vs IV estimates using Sisben and entry exam discontinuities as instruments.
Work at least 1 month Proposition of months working Work in the last semester
Sisben disc. Exam disc. Sisben disc. Exam disc. Sisben disc. Exam disc.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A: All
Enrolled 0.068∗∗ 0.607+ 0.069∗∗ 0.266 0.041∗∗ 0.771∗∗ 0.042∗∗ -0.033 0.027∗∗ 0.715∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.007
(0.012) (0.335) (0.008) (0.195) (0.007) (0.245) (0.007) (0.124) (0.009) (0.280) (0.008) (0.120)
F test 20.23 31.06 27.70 26.27 26.42 31.64
R2 0.17 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.16 -0.22 0.17 0.17 0.13 -0.08 0.14 0.14
Bandwidth 9.40 9.40 7.04 7.04 10.36 10.36 6.31 6.31 10.43 10.43 7.35 7.35
N 20847 20847 30756 30756 22939 22939 28020 28020 23102 23102 31862 31862
Panel B: Women
Enrolled 0.062∗∗ 0.009 0.086∗∗ 0.092 0.026+ 0.194 0.048∗∗ -0.097 0.017 0.052 0.039∗∗ -0.109
(0.014) (0.500) (0.012) (0.289) (0.013) (0.343) (0.010) (0.147) (0.016) (0.342) (0.011) (0.213)
F test 8.34 14.17 11.83 13.40 12.29 14.40
R2 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12
Bandwidth 9.67 9.67 7.16 7.16 10.70 10.70 9.09 9.09 12.56 12.56 7.27 7.27
N 10361 10361 15329 15329 11573 11573 18602 18602 13633 13633 15512 15512
Panel C: Men
Enrolled 0.066∗∗ 0.882∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.692∗ 0.049∗∗ 1.166∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.208 0.038∗∗ 1.017∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.449
(0.012) (0.255) (0.007) (0.284) (0.005) (0.267) (0.006) (0.211) (0.008) (0.302) (0.007) (0.366)
F test 44.37 25.71 45.85 27.67 46.01 22.94
R2 0.19 -0.17 0.21 -0.09 0.18 -0.75 0.19 0.16 0.14 -0.32 0.16 0.05
Bandwidth 12.65 12.65 6.07 6.07 12.99 12.99 5.66 5.66 13.01 13.01 5.38 5.38
N 14435 14435 13815 13815 14800 14800 12971 12971 14816 14816 12426 12426
Notes: As per table 2.
The results are conclusive. For all three variables in the case of the Sisben’s discontinuity IV estimates are
significantly larger than OLS estimates. However, when we instrument with the exam discontinuity IV and OLS
estimates are not significantly different from each other.
According to Carneiro and Heckman (2002) the latest analysis have some important weaknesses. First,
instruments in the literature are usually invalid or weak. We already showed that both discontinuities are
strong instruments of enrollment. Furthermore, the RD environment supports the validity of our instruments.
According to Lee and Lemieux (2010), if (1) there is no manipulation of the forcing variable by the cutoff, and
(2) observable and unobservable variables are continuous around the cutoff, then RD estimations represent a
experiment by the cutoff. Appendix A contains the evidence supporting the validity of both RD estimations.
Hence, both our instruments are strong and valid.
Second, the difference between IV and OLS can be explained by differences in individuals’ comparative
advantage in the labor market. This drawback is common when instruments come from regional variations in
the cost of education. In our estimations we control for Sena center and program type fixed effects. Therefore,
applicants on both sides of each cutoff are likely to be facing the same labor markets. In addition, following the
assumption of continuity of observable and unobservable factors around the cutoff, one can argue that individual
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Table 5: Effect of enrollment in Sena for applicants to two-year courses on formal labor market stability. OLS vs
IV estimates using Sisben and entry exam discontinuities as instruments.
Longest employment spell Longest employment spell1 Longest unemployment spell
Sisben disc. Exam disc. Sisben disc. Exam disc. Sisben disc. Exam disc.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A: All
Enrolled 0.404∗∗ 15.391∗ 0.469∗∗ 0.413 -0.156 15.079 -0.140 -3.158 -0.690∗∗ -13.600∗∗ -0.651∗∗ 1.899
(0.109) (7.040) (0.130) (1.769) (0.136) (9.362) (0.183) (2.730) (0.110) (4.369) (0.095) (2.621)
F test 21.02 27.66 17.70 33.06 27.48 32.52
R2 0.18 -0.41 0.18 0.18 0.10 -0.64 0.08 0.04 0.13 -0.29 0.15 0.12
Bandwidth 9.51 9.51 7.49 7.49 7.03 7.03 7.73 7.73 10.36 10.36 4.43 4.43
N 21109 21109 32331 32331 10601 10601 21953 21953 22931 22931 20619 20619
Panel B: Women
Enrolled 0.145 1.899 0.490∗∗ -1.951 -0.537∗∗ 5.952 -0.136 -2.304 -0.498∗ -4.074 -0.835∗∗ 4.176
(0.160) (5.503) (0.131) (2.319) (0.173) (5.522) (0.211) (3.636) (0.207) (6.148) (0.158) (2.557)
F test 11.06 23.28 9.04 18.47 12.52 12.13
R2 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.08
Bandwidth 11.69 11.69 12.39 12.39 8.40 8.40 8.50 8.50 11.74 11.74 6.69 6.69
N 12640 12640 23604 23604 6048 6048 11359 11359 12700 12700 14462 14462
Panel C: Men
Enrolled 0.519∗∗ 22.701∗∗ 0.306∗ 5.471 -0.114 22.412∗∗ -0.199 -4.326 -0.760∗∗ -14.704∗∗ -0.468∗∗ -6.258
(0.102) (6.472) (0.126) (4.205) (0.142) (6.637) (0.191) (2.988) (0.086) (4.161) (0.103) (4.005)
F test 44.20 21.22 35.80 24.41 47.71 14.98
R2 0.21 -1.14 0.21 0.10 0.10 -1.66 0.10 0.02 0.14 -0.42 0.16 0.02
Bandwidth 12.62 12.62 5.25 5.25 13.88 13.88 7.78 7.78 12.83 12.83 4.98 4.98
N 14384 14384 12165 12165 10906 10906 11437 11437 14648 14648 11634 11634
Notes: As per table 2.
1 Conditional on having work at least one month.
comparative advantage in the labor market does not change radically around the cutoffs.
Finally, according to Carneiro and Heckman (2002) the OLS and IV comparison neglects the choice of quality
of schooling. In our analysis all individuals applied to the same institution (Sena). What is more, we show that
eligibility to financial aid did not create any kind of sorting in two-year courses. Hence, the quality argument
does not apply in our case.
5.2 MRD estimations
As explained before, MRD estimations allow us to see how both discontinuities work for those individuals who
are close to both cutoffs. Tables 6 and 7 summarize the results.
The estimated coefficients in Table 6 suggest that financial aid is important for encouraging enrollment to
longer courses, while receiving the first offer is crucial for one-year courses. For one-year courses, the coefficient
of being eligible for financial aid alone (region IV in figure 4) is not statistically significant – α1 in table 6. This
means that eligibility for financial aid does not make a difference in enrollment if you do not get the first offer.
Nevertheless, receiving the first offer without any financial aid does create a significant change in enrollment
rates (region II in figure 4).
For two-year courses, the forces change. Individuals in region II, who received the first offer but were note
eligible for financial aid, do not have a differential enrollment rate comparing with individuals who did get the
first offer (α2 is not statistically significant). However, in this case eligibility for financial aid does increase
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Table 6: Double discontinuity estimation on enrolment in Sena
one-year course 2 years course
All Female Male All Female Male
Sisben discontinuity (α1) 0.092 0.084 0.137 0.075
∗ 0.014 0.146∗∗
(0.061) (0.087) (0.129) (0.033) (0.044) (0.040)
Exam discontinuity (α2) 0.166
∗∗ 0.188∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.055 0.120 0.013
(0.038) (0.071) (0.059) (0.035) (0.096) (0.070)
Sisben x Exam (α3) 0.021 0.021 -0.014 0.048
∗∗ 0.037 0.034
(0.021) (0.048) (0.025) (0.016) (0.039) (0.026)
Joint significance tests
H0 : α1 + α3 = 0 0.122 0.187 0.346 0.001 0.441 0.000
H0 : α2 + α3 = 0 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.030 0.429
H0 : α1 + α2 + α3 = 0 0.001 0.008 0.050 0.000 0.014 0.002
Sisben’s bandwidth 11.67 11.67 11.67 9.83 9.83 9.83
Exam’s bandwidth 3.85 3.85 3.85 4.38 4.38 4.38
R2 0.30 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.32 0.28
N 3562 1644 1918 5923 2757 3166
Notes: Standard errors clustered at municipality level, + 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01. 10 points bandwidth for both scores. We use a 3rd degree polynomial
for the distance to each cutoff. All estimations includes control variables as table 2. α1, α2 and α3 as equation 5. We report the p-values of a
Wald test on each null hypothesis.
enrollment, independently of receiving the first offer. In addition, the interaction of both discontinuities is only
statistically significant for the case of two-year course. This does not mean that individuals in region I of the
figure 4 do not have a larger probability of enrolling in one-year courses. When we test if the sum of α1+α2+α3
the result is a p value below 0.05. However, what we can conclude is that for two-year courses, receiving the
first offer only increases the probability of enrolling if the individual is eligible for financial aid.
Combining results from the estimations in one- and two-year courses we can conclude that financial aid gains
importance when the opportunity cost of studying increases. This is the case when individuals need to stay not
one year but two years outside the labor market in order to study.
Table 7 presents the importance of our running variables on the chance of completing the instructional period
and obtaining a diploma at Sena. However, none of these discontinuities have any effect on completion once
the individual has taken part in Senas educational process. A feasible interpretation of the results shown in
this table is that once the admitted student obtains a quantity of money to pay for her daily expenses, the
probability of obtaining the diploma depends on reasons other than the cost of maintenance and the difficulty
of the course. Furthermore, our hypothesis is reaffirmed by the fact that the size of the coefficients for the
completion outcome are smaller than that of the models whose outcome variable is completed on the condition
of being enrolled.
5.3 Heterogeneity of results
In this section, we study how our results may change for different types of individuals. Our focus is further un-
derstanding the role of liquidity constraints checking if our estimates do change when the economic environment
is more or less likely to have higher constraints to post-secondary education.
The two previous sections show differential effects by gender. First, table 2 show no heterogeneous effect
on enrollment rates by gender in the case of the Sisben and the exam’s discontinuity. Although, when we
analyze the returns to Sena schooling on labor market participation, we found no returns to women. When we
instrument schooling, the resulting coefficient for women is never significantly different than zero (tables 4 and
5). In addition, MRD estimations showed the positive effect of financial aid in enrollment for individuals who
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Table 7: Double discontinuity estimation on studies completion in Sena
one-year course 2 years course
All Female Male All Female Male
Panel A: Completed studies
Sisben discontinuity (α1) 0.031 0.018 0.056 0.008 0.007 0.011
(0.023) (0.051) (0.037) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Exam discontinuity (α2) 0.002 -0.013 0.041 -0.006 -0.013
+ 0.001
(0.036) (0.056) (0.029) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Sisben x Exam (α3) 0.005 0.017 -0.014 0.006
∗ 0.005 0.006
(0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Joint significance tests
H0 : α1 + α3 = 0 0.233 0.570 0.275 0.045 0.068 0.110
H0 : α2 + α3 = 0 0.784 0.941 0.305 0.949 0.361 0.026
H0 : α1 + α2 + α3 = 0 0.321 0.738 0.132 0.296 0.906 0.051
Sisben’s bandwidth 12.93 12.93 12.93 13.86 13.86 13.86
Exam’s bandwidth 5.70 5.70 5.70 9.96 9.96 9.96
R2 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.07
N 5677 2606 3071 16792 7824 8968
Panel B: Completed studies | enrolled
Sisben discontinuity (α1) 0.064 0.048 0.145 0.012 -0.000 0.021
(0.081) (0.153) (0.137) (0.025) (0.045) (0.024)
Exam discontinuity (α2) -0.104 -0.236
∗ 0.082 -0.019 -0.048 -0.015
(0.082) (0.108) (0.081) (0.027) (0.045) (0.024)
Sisben x Exam (α3) -0.024 -0.029 -0.051 0.024
+ 0.013 0.034
(0.027) (0.042) (0.051) (0.014) (0.019) (0.025)
Joint significance tests
H0 : α1 + α3 = 0 0.604 0.898 0.467 0.215 0.706 0.160
H0 : α2 + α3 = 0 0.088 0.020 0.677 0.810 0.498 0.158
H0 : α1 + α2 + α3 = 0 0.568 0.284 0.275 0.513 0.464 0.177
Sisben’s bandwidth 13.09 13.09 13.09 12.43 12.43 12.43
Exam’s bandwidth 7.82 7.82 7.82 7.89 7.89 7.89
R2 0.20 0.27 0.24 0.19 0.27 0.19
N 2067 961 1106 3508 1523 1985
Notes: As per table 6.
applied to two-year courses. This effect is only significant for men.
The latest findings show two things. First, our evidence of liquidity constraints only applied for men. Second,
we do not find positive returns to Sena schooling for women. Multiple hypotheses can explain this difference.
Firstly, women and men may choose different courses with lower average returns. Figure 5 shows evidence
that there is no sorting with respect to gender. The figure compares the average return by course type as
the probability of working in the formal sector after studying with the proportion of males applying to each
course type. The figure shows no correlation between male participation and average returns for neither one- or
two-year courses.
Another possible explanation is related to the effects of fertility and informality. Our sample includes individ-
uals from 18 to 24 years old (around 20 to 26 years old when we analyze labor market participation). According
to our data, labor market participation is larger for men (63% and 56% for men and women respectively). In
addition, by age 25, 51% of women already have their first child, the percentage increase to 73.5% by age 29
(Profamilia, 2016). Given that we do not observe neither unemployment, informal labor market participation
or the likelihood of being outside of the labor market, we cannot test if women prefer informality or leaving the
labor market in order to take care of their children.
Additionally, we explore four other dimensions. First, we compare individuals who were assessed in area
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Figure 5: Average labor market participation and male proportion by course type
(a) one-year course (b) two-year course
Notes: Authors calculations using Sena and PILA information. 246 courses in total.
1 (main urban areas) with individuals from areas 2 and 3. Second, we divide the population into individuals
who studied in a departmental capital city, which are usually cities where labor markets are more dynamic and
also the supply of tertiary education is larger. Third, we separate individuals according to their age when they
applied to Sena in two groups, individuals from 18 to 20 years old and individuals from 21 to 24 years old.
Fourth, we analyze individuals using a proxy for migration. We deﬁne as migrant an individual who applied to
study in a municipality diﬀerent from the municipality where she was assessed for the Sisben score.
Figure 6 shows the average enrollment and labor market participation by each category of analysis. There
are some patterns in the data. Enrollment is lower in area 1 but labor market participation is larger. The
comparison between capital and non-capital cities follow a similar pattern. Moreover, enrollment decreases and
labor market participation increases with age. Finally, there are not diﬀerence in average enrollment and labor
market participation with respect to migration.
We estimate equations 1 and 2 for each category and show the estimated coeﬃcients in ﬁgure 7. For one-year
courses we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence by any variable and group. However, for two-year courses the
area of origin seems to have an eﬀect on the estimated impact of each discontinuity. On the one hand, individuals
in Area 1 (main metropolitan areas) seem to react less to eligibility to ﬁnancial aid than individuals from other
areas. On the other hand, individuals in Area 1 seem to react more to receiving the ﬁrst oﬀer than individuals
from other areas.
To explain the latest diﬀerences we have some hypotheses. The ﬁrst factor that could explain this diﬀerence
is migration. Individuals from area 1 are less likely to migrate than individuals from rural areas. A migrant
individual may have higher maintenance costs and is therefore more likely to need ﬁnancial aid. In addition,
without ﬁnancial aid, a migrant individual is less likely to use her place in a course and therefore the eﬀect of
the exam discontinuity is smaller. However, as we can see in the same ﬁgure, even though the estimated impacts
of each discontinuity have the expected relationship, the diﬀerences between migrants and non-migrants are not
statistically signiﬁcant.
A second factor explaining the diﬀerence between areas could be access to other sources of credit – formal
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Figure 6: Labor market participation and enrollment rates by groups (one- and two-year courses)
(a) By area (b) Capital city and others
(c) By age (d) By migration status
Notes: Authors calculations using Sena and PILA information. 246 courses in total.
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Figure 7: Estimated RD coefficients on enrollment for each discontinuity by categories
one-year courses
(a) Sisben discontinuity - β1 (b) Exam discontinuity - ρ1
two-year courses
(c) Sisben discontinuity - β1 (d) Exam discontinuity - ρ1
Notes: Following equations 1 and 2. Control variables as per table 2. 95% coefficients intervals.
22
and informal. Individuals from area 1 may have access to larger social networks that could allow them to borrow
money or even study without working. Therefore, their sensibility to financial aid is smaller than the sensibility
of those who come from more rural areas. Unfortunately, with our data we cannot test this hypothesis.
Figure 8: Double discontinuity estimations on enrollment in Sena by Sisben area and migration status (For
applicants to two-year courses)
(a) By area (b) By migration status
Notes: As per table 6.
Using the MRD analysis we can check if individuals by both margins, poverty and exam discontinuity, react
differently when they come from different areas. Therefore, we estimate equation 5 for individuals in each group.
We also check differences by migration status to support the analysis by area. Figure 8 shows the resulting
estimates. The differences we found before disappear. Therefore, in the margin, we do not find evidence of
differential effects by region or migration status.
5.4 Measurement error
According to Griliches (1977) and Angrist and Keueger (1991), another reason from which IV estimates are
large than OLS estimates is that measurement error could overcome the effect of the ability bias. In our
case, we can argue that the possibility of measurement error comes from other alternatives of post-secondary
education different from Sena. Therefore, our estimations of returns to schooling are not capturing the returns
of individuals that may have taken other vocational courses or may have even joined college. There are some
results in our estimations that support the idea that our estimations capture the effect of liquidity constraints
and not the effect of measurement error.
The use of two RD designs allows us to think that both instruments are orthogonal to the possible measure-
ment error. If the instruments were not orthogonal and the results were driven by the possibility of measurement
error, we would have found that IV estimates are larger than OLS estimates for the case of discontinuity in the
entry exam as well.
Another possibility is that the likelihood of demanding post-secondary education different from Sena de-
creases with the availability of financial aid. Therefore, the effect of measurement error is larger for individuals
who are eligible for JeA, which explains why IV estimates are larger than OLS in the case of the Sisben discon-
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Table 8: Effect of enrollment in Sena for applicants to two-year courses on formal labor market participation.
OLS vs IV estimates using Sisben discontinuities as instrument. Capital city vs non-capital city.
Proportion of months working Work in the last semester
Capital Others Capital Others
OLS 0.041∗∗ 0.037∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.036∗
(0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015)
IV 1.043∗∗ 0.799+ 0.978∗ 0.778
(0.377) (0.447) (0.458) (0.758)
F test 15.41 14.55 15.05 14.37
R2 -0.49 -0.32 -0.25 -0.12
Bandwidth 10.79 14.67 10.45 14.56
N 18258 7152 17674 7079
Notes: As per table 2.
tinuity.
Following this logic, one can expect that the bias was even stronger in cities with a larger supply of tertiary
education, such as capital cities. However, when we estimate the differences between OLS and IV for individuals
who applied to Sena in capital cities and other cities, we find that the effect is similar in both. The only difference
arises because our estimates are less precise for the estimations using individuals who did not apply in a capital
city.
6 Conclusions
Nobody doubts the importance of investing in human capital for individual and social welfare. However, access
to tertiary education is strongly correlated with initial individual welfare. Different factors such as ability,
taste and access to credit explain this correlation. In this paper, we provided evidence in favor of the effect of
monetary aid to increase enrollment in vocational studies for vulnerable low-income young individuals.
We used different approaches to show that liquidity constraints do reduce enrollment rates, even in the case
of free vocational education in Colombia. We found evidence of liquidity constraints for men, but we did not
find statistically significant returns to vocational education for women.
This paper expands the debate about the ways to increase access to post-secondary education for low-income
individuals. Despite tuition are still the most important cost of tertiary education, policies that only take into
account reducing these fees may have limited efficiency, especially when the maintenance and opportunity cost
increase.
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A Validity of the RD design
According to Lee and Lemieux (2010), in order to estimate a policy’s causal effect using RD, two conditions
must be fulfilled. (i) All observable and unobservable characteristics are continuously related with the factor
variable. (ii) Individuals are not able to manipulate the factor variable. In this section we show evidence that
both assumptions hold for in the cases of the Sisben score and the entry exam score.16
Figure 9 shows graphical representation of the continuity in confounding characteristics around Sisben’s
cutoff (panels a to e for one-year courses and panels f to j for two-year courses). We do not observe any strong
change (a jump) around the cutoff for all the observable variables. However, the Sisben is employed to select
the beneficiaries for many other social programs in Colombia. Consequently the same cutoffs are used by JeA
as well as subsidised healthcare (RSS).17 RSS provides access to medical services without paying periodical
contributions and reduced co-payments to low-income households, specifically to individuals without a formal
job (or in a household where the head has no formal job) and living in a household with a Sisben score below
the cutoff points we use in this paper.18
Hence, identification could be compromised because individuals just below the cutoff are not only eligible to
JeA, but also to the RSS. Possible bias comes from the correlation between the decisions of demanding education
in Sena and RSS’s benefits. On the one hand, correlation may be negative because seeking tertiary education in
Sena is a signal of a desire to obtain a job in the formal labor market, but once an individual signs a contract, she
losses her RSS benefits. On the other hand, RSS means lower expenditure in healthcare. Therefore, individuals
may have less pressure to work after finishing high school and require more income to cover the costs of studying
at Sena.
Figure 10 shows the change in enrollment in Sena due to the Sisben’s discontinuity by application semester.
As we can see, when we take into account the participants in JeA the coefficients change from a positive sign to
a negative sign. This result can support the idea of a negative correlation between eligibility to RSS and JeA.
As result, our estimates may underestimate the total impact of being eligible for financial aid.
Regarding the entry exam, figure 11 shows the behavior of observable variables around each course cutoff.
It is important to remember that the cutoffs were simulated using the effect that JeA’s AA has on enrollment.
We do not find again significant jumps around the cutoffs. The small discontinuities in the Sisben score are the
result of changes in the cutoff due to the AA. However, in appendix B we discuss that these changes only affect
a small proportion of our sample and do not change the ability distribution of enrollees.
The second assumption for RD estimations means that individuals cannot manipulate their score. Figure
12 shows the distribution of each score around the cutoffs following Cattaneo et al. (2016). Based on the figure
and the discontinuity test we reject the hypothesis of manipulation of Sisben or exam scores by the cutoff.
Finally, for the estimation of the multiple regression discontinuity, we show that over the area around both
discontinuities there are no drastic changes. Figure 13 shows that for our set of observable covariates there are
not strong changes in the level of grey.
16It is important to point out that we test both assumptions only with our study sample, as explained in section 3
17RSS stands for Re´gimen Subsidiado en Salud in Spanish
18Details about RSS in Prosperidad-Social (2014)
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Figure 9: Continuity in observables around the Sisben’s cutoﬀ
one-year course
(a) Age (b) Gender (% male) (c) Entry exam score
(d) Applications (e) % takeout
two-year course
(f) Age (g) Gender (% male) (h) Entry exam score
(i) Applications (j) % takeout
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Figure 10: Sisben discontinuity on enrollment in Sena by enrollment semester. Conditional and unconditional of
JeA participation)
(a) Unconditional (b) Controlling by the effect of JeA
Using all applications from August 2013 to August 2015. The shades represent the period of our analysis. 95% confidence intervals in dashes lines.
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Figure 11: Continuity in observables around the entry exam’s cutoﬀ
one-year course
(a) Age (b) Gender (% male) (c) Sisben score
(d) Applications (e) % takeout
two-year course
(f) Age (g) Gender (% male) (h) Sisben score
(i) Applications (j) % takeout
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Figure 12: Manipulation test - density around the cutoff
Sisben score
(a) 1y. course (b) 2y. course
Entry exam
(c) 1y. course (d) 2y. course
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Figure 13: Continuity in observables around the entry exam and Sisben’s cutoff
one-year course
(a) Age (b) Gender (% male)
(c) Applications (d) % takeout
two-year course
(e) Age (f) Gender (% male)
(g) Applications (h) % takeout
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Figure 14: Important of preferential entry. Distribution of the proportion of JeA applicants and JeA enrollees in
a given course
(a) JeA applicants (b) JeA beneficiaries
Notes: Authors’ calculations using Sena applicants data.
B Affirmative action vs financial aid
As explained in section 4, τY includes the effect of all JeA components on Y . In this section, we show evidence
that, despite that the preferential entry do help some individuals to access into Sena, monetary aid does explain
most of our results. Table 9 shows the affirmative action’s effect on the composition of Sena applicants and
enrollees.
Table 9: Preferential entry effect on Sena’s composition
Never First offer Lost first offer Always
offered first due to AA due to AA offered first
Entry exam’s score 41.984 43.426 49.292 51.436
(0.470) (0.528) (0.787) (0.473)
% enrolled 0.072 0.467 0.291 0.505
(0.008) (0.026) (0.025) (0.017)
Individuals 78222 4799 3032 33736
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data from Sena. Standard error is parentheses. Simulations based on the entry exam results using
only courses with excess of demand and at least one JeA applicant.
As we can see, 4799 individuals gain an offer due to JeA’s preferential entry. This means that without
being part of JeA, their score would not have been enough to gain a first offer to join a course. Among these
individuals 47% enrolled in Sena. Furthermore, 3032 individuals who are not part of JeA did not get the first
offer because their exam cutoff increased due to JeA’s preferential entry. Nevertheless, 30% did enrolled in Sena.
This means the preferential entry affected 6.5% of total applicants.
In addition, figure 14 shows that both the proportion of JeA applicants and beneficiaries among the total
number of applicants and enrollees per course. None of these distributions jump around the preferential entry
quota. The continuity around 30% shows that the preferential entry is not more binding than usual which is
evidence of its low importance.
We can also test if the affirmative action changed the abilities distribution among Sena’s applicants and
enrollees. Panel a in figure 15 shows that there is no difference in the exam distribution among JeA applicants
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and non-applicants (neither eligible or non-eligible ones). Therefore, one can say that JeA does not attracts
better or worse applicants. However, panel b shoes how the simulated exam entry cutoff distribution for possible
beneficiaries of the Program moves left with respect to the distribution of those who did not ask for the benefits
of the Program. Nevertheless, when we see the distribution of the individuals that finally enroll in Sena, there
are no differences in the exam score of JeA applicants and non-applicants. Then, the distribution of abilities of
individuals enrolled in Sena did not depend on the effect that the affirmative action had on enrollment.
Figure 15: Sena entry exam and distribution of entry cutoffs for JeA applicants and non-applicants and enrollees
(a) Applicants (b) Entry cutoff
(c) Enrolled
Notes: Authors’ calculations using Sena applicants data.
Finally, figures 16 and 17 show the resulting coefficients of the interaction between being eligible for JeA and
the different groups created due to the existence of the AA. Panel a in both figures show the effect of the AA on
Sena enrollment. As expected, the effect of the Sisben discontinuity on enrollment is larger for those who got a
first offer thanks to the AA. However, when we examine labor market outcomes, the latest difference vanishes.
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Figure 16: Coefficients of the interaction between JeA eligibility and preferential entry group on different outcome
variables - one-year course
(a) Enrollment (b) Periods work
(c) Longest employment spell (d) Lonngest unemployment spell
(e) Formal job in the last 6 months
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Figure 17: Coefficients of the interaction between JeA eligibility and preferential entry group on different outcome
variables - two-year course
(a) Enrollment (b) Periods work
(c) Longest employment spell (d) Longest unemployment spell
(e) Formal job in the last 6 months
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C Supplementary tables and figures
Figure 18: Probability of applying to a one-year course by Sisben score and entry exam
(a) Sisben score (b) Entry exam
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Table 10: Effect of enrollment in Sena on formal labor market participation for applicants to one-year course.
OLS vs IV estimates using Sisben and entry exam discontinuities as instruments.
Work at least 1 month Proposition of months working Work in the last semester
Sisben disc. Exam disc. Sisben disc. Exam disc. Sisben disc. Exam disc.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A: All
Enrolled 0.086∗∗ 1.208+ 0.096∗∗ 0.588∗ 0.041∗∗ 1.194 0.047∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.010 2.067+ 0.017 0.484∗
(0.021) (0.728) (0.023) (0.261) (0.012) (0.793) (0.013) (0.107) (0.012) (1.149) (0.012) (0.211)
F test 5.74 30.33 5.18 37.60 5.46 32.39
R2 0.17 -0.28 0.18 0.02 0.16 -0.81 0.17 0.09 0.12 -1.42 0.12 -0.02
Bandwidth 12.34 12.34 4.71 4.71 12.49 12.49 4.33 4.33 12.28 12.28 5.18 5.18
N 18777 18777 15584 15584 19041 19041 14366 14366 18706 18706 16991 16991
Panel B: Women
Enrolled 0.150∗∗ 3.968 0.132∗∗ 0.341 0.068∗∗ 2.416 0.062∗∗ 0.080 0.076∗∗ 7.561 0.026∗ 0.152
(0.034) (11.638) (0.029) (0.310) (0.018) (5.190) (0.016) (0.195) (0.020) (22.463) (0.011) (0.189)
F test 0.18 20.53 0.28 21.10 0.14 25.48
R2 0.16 -4.33 0.15 0.13 0.14 -3.80 0.15 0.15 0.11 -17.93 0.10 0.09
Bandwidth 7.78 7.78 6.55 6.55 9.73 9.73 5.95 5.95 6.70 6.70 8.48 8.48
N 5692 5692 10855 10855 7040 7040 9946 9946 4883 4883 13746 13746
Panel C: Men
Enrolled 0.066∗∗ 0.952 0.062∗∗ 0.602 0.037∗∗ 1.781 0.037∗∗ 0.589∗∗ -0.003 2.208+ 0.017+ 0.899∗
(0.013) (1.039) (0.012) (0.374) (0.009) (1.261) (0.008) (0.214) (0.015) (1.209) (0.010) (0.366)
F test 5.38 16.19 4.04 17.01 4.09 15.39
R2 0.21 -0.10 0.21 0.02 0.19 -1.95 0.20 -0.17 0.14 -1.71 0.15 -0.33
Bandwidth 11.37 11.37 5.99 5.99 10.75 10.75 5.37 5.37 12.33 12.33 5.92 5.92
N 8830 8830 9381 9381 8324 8324 8507 8507 9648 9648 9290 9290
Notes: As per table 4.
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Table 11: Effect of enrollment in Sena on formal labor market stability for applicants to two-year courses. OLS
vs IV estimates using Sisben and entry exam discontinuities as instruments.
Longest employment spell Longest employment spell1 Longest unemployment spell
Sisben disc. Exam disc. Sisben disc. Exam disc. Sisben disc. Exam disc.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A: All
Enrolled 0.861∗∗ 18.574 0.861∗∗ 5.879+ 0.056 7.564 0.025 3.512 -1.052∗∗ -35.388 -1.175∗∗ -4.265
(0.215) (13.907) (0.235) (3.102) (0.155) (7.978) (0.179) (3.341) (0.329) (23.929) (0.389) (3.142)
F test 4.50 30.36 6.26 26.28 4.50 47.27
R2 0.16 -0.27 0.17 0.10 0.08 -0.00 0.09 0.06 0.14 -1.01 0.16 0.14
Bandwidth 11.99 11.99 4.87 4.87 12.26 12.26 6.40 6.40 11.99 11.99 3.61 3.61
N 18211 18211 16004 16004 10835 10835 11656 11656 18211 18211 12322 12322
Panel B: Women
Enrolled 1.511∗∗ 87.065 1.199∗∗ 0.113 0.348 3.615 0.148 -6.875 -1.867∗∗ -98.006 -1.603∗∗ -3.755
(0.331) (502.285) (0.292) (4.224) (0.426) (39.657) (0.245) (4.453) (0.511) (300.427) (0.499) (6.181)
F test 0.03 21.02 0.17 9.26 0.14 18.21
R2 0.14 -9.78 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.08 -0.05 0.13 -8.28 0.15 0.14
Bandwidth 8.62 8.62 6.38 6.38 8.44 8.44 7.09 7.09 8.96 8.96 4.82 4.82
N 6246 6246 10614 10614 3289 3289 6088 6088 6483 6483 8152 8152
Panel C: Men
Enrolled 0.633∗∗ 37.608 0.641∗∗ 13.436∗ -0.110 32.670 -0.152 17.502∗∗ -0.668∗ -34.638 -0.900∗∗ -17.891∗∗
(0.161) (27.992) (0.157) (5.626) (0.314) (42.526) (0.222) (5.315) (0.273) (24.607) (0.228) (6.670)
F test 3.46 15.51 1.18 18.73 5.52 12.82
R2 0.20 -1.61 0.20 -0.18 0.13 -1.39 0.11 -0.60 0.16 -0.99 0.17 -0.33
Bandwidth 10.65 10.65 5.77 5.77 8.25 8.25 8.44 8.44 11.33 11.33 4.84 4.84
N 8250 8250 9098 9098 4007 4007 7667 7667 8801 8801 7755 7755
Notes: As per table 4. 1 Conditional on having work at least one month.
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